A Comment on Some Uses and A buses of Economics
in Law
Frank L Michelmant
I, like Professor Posner, find economic analysis of law most
interesting in its guise of a positive or descriptive theory about the
making and content of law-positive as opposed to normative or
prescriptive, "making and content of law" as opposed to "impact
of law on conduct generally."' I also agree, although for reasons of
my own, with Posner's insistence that the positive economic theory
of law "deserves to be taken seriously."'2 His reason for thinking so
is the prima facie case he makes for the theory's empirical validity.
I would say that, whatever its validity (which certainly is not nil),
the theory must be taken seriously because it is exerting and is
destined to exert a strong influence on legal criticism. It does so by
offering to provide, through objective empirical research, an organic, historical pedigree for a plausible, intelligible, and trenchant
evaluative criterion on which scholars can proceed to base critical
studies of legal rules and doctrines.
It is some years now since Arthur Leff shrewdly pointed out how
economic analysis might serve as the answer to the modern legal
3
scholar's prayer for an objectively defensible critical standard.
Since I have elsewhere 4 discussed the ways in which we can all too
easily pass "from descriptive law to legal norm"-"from the perception of a pervasive and simplifying regularity in law to a belief that
law ought to conform to the perceived regularity"-I shall not dwell
on those matters here, although I shall return to them briefly later
on.
I further agree with Professor Posner that the positive economic
theory of the common law is a pretty tough nut to crack empirically
and that a number of the challenges to it have been misdirected. In
order to offer him this friendly support, however, I must also emphasize the modesty of the theory as it is circumspectly displayed in this
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
I See Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L. Rav. 281, 285
(1979).
1Id. at 284.
Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism A bout Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451
(1974).
Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MiNN. L. RPv.
1015 (1978).
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most recent of Posner's papers. Even here, I daresay Posner misdescribes his own theory by calling it "the hypothesis that commonlaw rules and institutions tend to promote economic efficiency." 5 A
more accurate statement of the hypothesis, I believe, would be that
the rules, taken as a whole, tend to look as though they were chosen
with a view to maximizing social wealth (economic output as
measured by price) by judges subscribing to a certain set of
("microeconomic") theoretical principles.
My presumptuous attempt at restatement is meant to qualify
Posner's version of his theory in one respect and clarify it in another.
My qualification is that the hypothesis is correctly understood as
directly concerned only with the behavior of judges, and not (or only
secondarily) with the actual, measurable economic impact or virtue
of the rules they choose. The claim, I believe, is only that judges en
masse appear to act as if they were choosing rules according to the
principles of microeconomic theory, not that these principles themselves are fully adequate or correct descriptions of the world. I say
this for two reasons. First, I am not aware that Posner has made any
systematic attempt to trace the real-world impacts of the rules he
characterizes as "efficient." 6 Second, in espousing the claim that
the rules promote efficiency, Posner takes on the burden of defending against attacks on the empirical reliability of microeconomic
theory itself-that is, of refuting studies indicating that the effects
of legal rules are not just what that body of theory would predict.
For example, a recent essay by Philip Shuchman concludes, after
analysis of data that seems at least initially persuasive, that a number of changes (or cross-jurisdictional variations) in bankruptcy law
do not seem to have had the effects on behavior that microeconomic
theory would have predicted.' The results seem to suggest that there
are motivational forces at work not fairly capturable by any noncircular notion of price or cost.'
It must be left up to Posner whether he will treat such a study
(until refuted) as a problem for his theory. He must so treat it if he
really wants to claim not only that judges act as if guided by microPosener, supra note 1, at 285; see id. at 288.
Thus Posner describes the studies on which his hypothesis relies as having shown "a
convergence, frequently subtle and unexpected, between common-law rules and . . .
economic theory." Id. at 290 (emphasis added). He does, however, call attention to other
studies of selected legal interventions, which support the practical applicability of economic
theory. See id. at 286.
7 Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 66 (1977).
8 For example, making bankruptcy objectively less costly or onerous for the bankrupt
seems not to escalate the bankruptcy rate.

1979l

Comment on Uses and Abuses

economic theory, but also that they actually bring about economically virtuous results by so acting. He need not so treat it, however,
if he will be satisfied with my more modest version of his claim. (As
we shall see later, though, even the modest version will be in some
trouble if microeconomic theory is not itself thought to be reliable
or "good.")
The respect in which I intend my restatement to clarify Posner's version of his theory pertains to the use of the word
"efficiency," which you will note is omitted from my restatement.
"Efficiency" is too loose and evocative a term for scientific usage,
too likely-as I shall shortly explain-to mask some serious questions about the plausibility of Posner's hypothesis. For some,
"efficiency" will connote a state of affairs in which, taking into
account all individual preferences of whatever kind or nature,
whether or not responsive to variations in price (or cost in some
other noncircular conception), *nogeneral improvement is possible.
But it explicitly is not Posner's hypothesis that the common-law
data reflect a judicial purpose of attaining efficiency in anything
like that sense. Rather, according to his analysis of the data, the
reflected judicial purpose is to bring about a "wealth maximizing"
allocation of resources-that is, to bring about the production of just
that mix of goods, services, and environmental states for which the
total of the maximum individual offering prices, given the extant
distribution of wealth, would be highest.' The criterion thus
"counts" all and only those goods, services, and states that market
observation and common sense can show us, with reasonable certainty, to have an approximately measurable economic exchange
value. Omitted from the calculus, then, are two kinds of items: (1)
goods, services, and states that in principle have discoverable private exchange values but for which in practice no such values can
be objectively estimated, 0 and (2) goods, services, and states that
have no private exchange value even in principle, such as the classical utilitarian aim of general improvement through an equalizing
redistributive process exploiting the (supposed) diminishing marPosner is explicit that he uses "efficiency" to mean wealth maximization. Posner, supra

note 1, at 291. His claims would be clearer (and one of their weaknesses would to too) if he
would simply stop saying "efficiency" when wealth maximization is what he means. See text
and notes at notes 13-18 infra.

11Objective estimates are impossible where there are neither explicit markets generating
prices for the goods (services, states) in question, nor implicit substitution or exchange rela-

tions between those goods and other goods having explicit prices from which "shadow prices"
might be inferred for the goods in question. An example would be the "good" consisting of
assurance that defaulting debtors will not be thumbscrewed as a means of inducing them to
pay up.
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ginal utility of wealth.
Once we have the theory cast in terms of wealth maximization
rather than efficiency in any broader sense, two objections that have
prominently been urged against the theory fall away. Some critics,
as Posner notes, have dwelt on the incoherence of the efficiency
criterion' if it is not tied to some initial distribution of wealth and
so claimed there is circularity in the criterion Posner would use to
explain the content of law.11 The critics' argument is that since we
cannot know what allocation is efficient until we know who controls
what share of the purchasing power, we cannot talk of fashioning the
network of legal entitlements (that is, sharing out the purchasing
power) by reference to the dependent efficiency criterion. But a
sharp focus on the notion of wealth maximization does much to
contain (though it cannot absolutely demolish) this criticism. A
litigated case presents a judge with a sharply restricted set of
choices of liability awards and rule formulations. Probably no choice
within the available set will significantly alter the price system or
wealth distribution then observable in the economy. The judge,
then, can intelligibly be supposed to choose an award and a formulation with a view to maximizing economic output as gauged by
observable prices and inferable shadow prices.
Other critics have attacked the hypothesis imputing an efficiency characteristic to law as tautological, "analytic," nonempirical, or nonfalsifiable. We can see how the hypothesis can become
nonfalsifiable if we begin, for example, with the (safe) assumption
that no court would award Shylock a pound of Antonio. Professor
Posner subscribes to this prediction, remarking that it is "puzzling"
from an economic standpoint. 2 I suppose he means that an economist would have to observe about the case that Shylock and Antonio
must both have expected to improve their welfares by agreeing to
the secured loan in the first place, and that if the law refuses to
enforce in terrorem sanctions voluntarily agreed to by borrowers,
thus destroying their credibility to lenders, the effect will be an
inefficient syndrome of increased costs to borrowers, reduced demand for loans, and diminished profits to lenders. It thus looks as
though the presumed unenforceability of Shylock's contract is significant evidence against the positive economic theory of law.
Some, though not Professor Posner, might reject this evidence.
If we will adhere doggedly enough to the hypothesis (assumption)
that judges always choose the efficient course, they might say, all
"1
12

See Posner, supra note 1, at 291-92.
R. PosNER, ECONOMC ANALYSIS OF LAW 187 (2d ed. 1977).
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will yet be well. From that assumption, combined with any observation we make of judicial refusals to enforce, we can deduce that the
judges have somehow divined that members of society at large
would be distressed enough by contemplation of the mayhem on
Antonio that all together, if they could only overcome the transactions costs, would actually offer Shylock enough to make it worth
his while to relent. This method of reifying moral values into quasieconomic commodities known as "moralisms" easily can be deployed to bring all possible judicial decisions and formulations
within the economic theory, which will then be nonfalsifiable and
worthless.' But Professor Posner is impervious to this attack. For
him, the Shylock case is really counterevidence to his theory-a
"puzzle"-and will remain so until, if ever, he can figure out how
to rationalize it in terms of an economic-efficiency calculus that
counts only objectively appraisable commodities: goods, services,
and states that can fairly be said to have prices or shadow prices.
Now if there are some criticisms of Posner's theory that can be
blunted by care in specifying wealth maximization rather than
"efficiency" as the imputed judicial aim, it must also be admitted
that this same care may aggravate a different weakness. It is, after
all, a striking-a remarkable-notion that the mass of judicial decisions and rules should turn out to meet the standard of wealth
maximization. Why should we expect anything like that to happen,
unless the standard itself possesses a strong moral appeal-either
for moral philosophers, if we want to suppose judges to be such, or
for the members of society generally, judges included? Of course a
standard of "efficiency" in the all-encompassing sense I earlier mentioned would have the requisite appeal, but it also would leave the
theory unable to explain anything, and in any case we know it is not
the standard Posner has in mind. On the other hand, the wealth
maximization standard he does intend, and which (in principle) can
explain things, is less intuitively appealing. As various critics have
pointed out, the wealth maximization standard for choice of law is
(at least in its immediate applications) apparently biased in favor
of the wealthy, is oblivious to questions of distributive justice, and
in general disregards all human valuations or motivations that are
not responsive to considerations of price, or cost, in a sense approximately measurable by methods available to economic science.,, But
if wealth maximization is such an inadequate standard of justice as
See the discussion in Michelman, supranote 4, at 1035-37.
"See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology of Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOSOPHY & Pun. AF'.
3 (1975).
'
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that short diatribe suggests, why should we expect to find judges
relying on it?
Posner suggests at various points that he need not face that
question squarely in order to defend his positive theory, 5 but I am
not so sure. In science, there may be some purely empirical hypotheses to which the data conform so clearly, so strikingly, so uniformly, that we are persuaded of their truth (in the pragmatic sense)
although we haven't a clue to any causal mechanism that may be
producing the phenomena we observe. In other instances, the conformity of data to an empirical hypothesis, while detectible, is also
irregular enough, the available measurements are lax enough, the
general picture is murky enough, that a plausible causal explanation is required to make us believe in the theory. For me, the positive economic theory of the common law is definitely in the latter
class. There are highly significant "anomalies" among the phenomena, as Posner always honorably confesses."6 The Shylock problem
can stand as a symbol for an important category of these: the powerful strain of antiforfeiture doctrine that has coursed through our law
at least since the chancellors of old began inventing the "equity of
redemption" on behalf of mortgagors. 17 In addition to the problem
of clear counterinstances, it is often difficult to distinguish between
confirmatory and contradictory instances, a result of the loose,
rather jerry-built structure taken on by the empirical hypothesis as
it is elaborated to accommodate the various phenomena presented
to it.,8
I read Posner not as denying the need for a causal part to his
explanatory theory of law (such as, "judges strive, more or less
consciously, to make the law wealth-maximizing because of a widespread social intuition that it is good to have wealth-maximizing
law"), but as admitting the need and suggesting how it might be
filled. He refers to explanations that have been advanced for the
law's wealth-maximizing properties that entail no supposition
about judicial preference or intention, but indicates that he is, himSee Posner, supra note 1 at 285, 286, 291.
"E.g., id. at 290-91.
17Posner is quite aware that antiforfeiture doctrine poses a major problem for his theory.
See id. For an extended consideration of the value of mercy as displayed in our legal doctrines and practices, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
Is The hypothesis moves back and forth, none too predictably, among several levels of
analysis: the comparative private valuations of interacting activities, the costs of errors in
judicial attempts to estimate these private valuations, the comparative administrative costs
of particularized inquiry under broad principles and categorical application of more specific
("per se") rules, and the costs of risk, uncertainty, and legal instability.
"
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self, uncertain of their validity."0 He also suggests that "efficiency"
(meaning wealth-maximization) may have a stronger moral appeal
than critics allow, espcially when we are looking for a criterion to
govern law-choice by judges, where "[c]onsiderations of the just
distribution of wealth or other 'justice' factors on which a social
consensus is lacking would introduce an unacceptable2 degree of
subjectivity and uncertainty into the judicial process.
Here I believe we are getting close to the heart of the Posnerian
theory of law. When Posner says that "efficiency. . .may be the
only value that a system of common-law rulemaking can effectively
promote, '21 we need not understand him as denying that some cognizable "value" is "promoted" by antiforfeiture doctrine or by declining to carve up Antonio, and certainly not as asserting that the
value in such decisions is that of wealth-maximization. Rather, he
can be understood as insisting on confining the politically unaccountable judiciary to furtherance of the set of socially uncontested
values-a set of which the value of maximizing wealth (other things
equal) is evidently thought to be a member, indeed the only known
member. But if it is thus "the [politically irresponsible] system of
common-law rulemaking" that is supposed to condition the suggested judicial prediliction and societal tolerance for law guided by
no "value" save wealth-maximization, it remains for the theory to
explain why society would (or might, or ought to) have hit upon a
system of judicial lawmaking having such a momentous and (as
some would have it) monstrous entailment. To this separate question,22 1 shall offer here only my conclusion, which is that the degree
to which one is comfortable with the argument (and there is one)
leading to preference for such a lawmaking system depends upon
how thoroughly one is imbued with a cautious positivistic view of
the capacity and reliability of human speculative reason, intuition,
and insight. Insofar as one shares in this antimetaphysical and
value-skeptical spirit, one may see no acceptable alternative, for
principled lawmakers, to setting aside unobservable entities such as
welfare and contested evaluational concepts such as justice in favor
of observables such as willingness to pay and incontestable values
such as those actually manifested in choices individuals make.
Which of us really thinks this way? To test whether you do, you
11Posner,
2 Id.
21 Id.
22

supra note 1, at 289 n.31, 292.
at 292.
(footnote omitted).

For an exploration of this issue at greater length, see Michelman, Economic Appraisal
ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF

of ConstitutionalLaw: A MethodologicalPreface, in ESSAYS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (D. Rubinfeld ed. 1979) (forthcoming).
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might ask yourself what is to be done if: (1) we become persuaded
by Posner's empirical claim that the mass of common-law data
show a marked though imperfect tendency to regress on the norm
of wealth maximization, and (2) we do not know how to formulate
any other explanatory norm (at a roughly comparable level of simplicity) that seems able to explain or organize any sizeable fraction
of the data. Shall we conclude that we have now glimpsed the law's
true "implicit economic logic," and that the nonconforming data,
then, are excrescences to be cast off? If not, why not?
A related question, I believe, is: What does Posner mean when
he says that judges should be "cautioned" not to adopt economic
discourse explicity?2 If, as he suggests, wealth maximization is "the
only value that a system of common law rulemaking can effectively
promote," and if allowing judicial consideration of other "'justice'
factors. . . would introduce an unacceptable degree of subjectivity
and uncertainty into the judicial process," how are we not forced to
insist that our judges both learn economics correctly and use it
openly? One does not, presumably, want judges acting irresponsibly, unaccountably, vagrantly, capriciously, or in a muddle. If one
also does not think "justice factors" (wealth maximization aside)
can supply a coherent or intelligible discipline for judges, how does
one avoid the conclusion that a judge is censurable for not mastering
and correctly applying economic theory? How, for that matter, does
one avoid the conclusion that Shylock must have his pound of flesh?
Is it possible, while persisting in the belief that judges act
rightly only insofar as they act subject to the constraints imposed
by an extant collection of authoritative legal materials and a disciplined method for construing them, to think that it would be wrong
and irresponsible for a judge to grant specific relief to Shylock?
Certainly Posner's empirical findings do not rule out such a possibility as long as we are prepared to let the Shylock case make us
believe the true law contains some principle or principles, value or
values, rule or rules, other than wealth maximization. His findings
will then strike us-as Posner himself puts it-as having revealed
"one explanatory variable among several linked together in a more
complex model," and Posner's observation that attempts by scholars to formulate the others have been "perfunctory"26 will not dispel
the conviction that they are there all the same, or that it would be
R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 179-81.
u Posner, supra note 1, at 300.

21Id. at 293.
21Id. at 294.
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a radical alteration of existing law to reduce it to the principle of
wealth maximization.Y
Here, then, is a possible reason for caution about systematic
indoctrination of judges with economic learning. By such indoctrination we might contrive to squeeze out of the law the poorly defined noneconomic variables or "other justice factors." But
some-including Posner, it appears-would hesitate before thus
exchanging the vices of "subjectivity and uncertainty" for the beatitude of economic purity.
nSee Michelman, supranote 4. It seems that Posner would agree. On the one hand, he
does speak of the "unacceptable degree of subjectivity and uncertainty" that results from
judicial consideration of "other 'justice' factors on which a social consensus is lacking." Posner, supra note 1, at 292. On the other hand, the antiforfeiture doctrine is clearly established,
not uncertain, and perhaps can be taken to reflect a social consensus even if no one can say
on precisely what point or principle. Moreover, Posner concedes, id. at 302, that it is
"reasonable" for "a practicing lawyer" to refuse to "ignore any part of the jumble," and that
probably is meant to hold for judges too.

